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Today, intrusion detection systems provide for detecting intrusive patterns of 
interaction. Although the responses of such systems are typically limited to primitive 
actions, they can be supplemented with deception-based strategies. We propose a generic 
software architecture combining intrusion detection and deceptive response capabilities 
in a uniform structure. Detecting and responding to attacks are realized via runtime 
instrumentation of kernel-based modules. The architecture provides for dynamically 
adjusting system performance to maintain continuity and integrity of both legitimate 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As military forces around the globe become ever more reliant on software-
intensive systems for war fighting, the importance of these systems increases. Today, 
intrusion detection systems provide for detecting intrusive patterns of interaction; 
however, responses against attacks are limited to primitive actions such as terminating 
the intrusive processes and shutting down the system. As a result, valuable information 
about the attacks cannot be collected, which might otherwise be used to improve the 
security mechanism’s capabilities to manage the exposure of information systems to the 
suspicious behavior of programs, with which they interact. 
Deception-based strategies can be incorporated into intrusion detection and 
response systems to address to some extent the aforementioned weakness. The history of 
deception in military operations presents a wide spectrum of possibilities to realize 
deception in military information systems. We use deception as an active software 
component that interacts with intruders and provides fake responses to gather information 
about the nature of their interaction while protecting the key assets of the targeted system. 
The level of sophistication involved in those responses can be adjusted based on 
considerations such as system performance, the value of protected assets, the threat level 
of the attacks, and global security policies.  
Intrusion detection systems are designed to discover intrusions on a computing 
system or the misuse of a computing system. However, most of the time these systems 
fail to differentiate between malicious actions of an attacker versus the egregious use of 
these resources by legitimate users. False positives and negatives along with monitoring 
overhead are problematic for intrusion detection systems, irrespective of whether they 
provide for anomaly, misuse, or signature-based detection. While some intrusion 
detection systems include response mechanisms, the capabilities of those mechanisms are 
constrained by the performance overhead introduced by both monitoring and response 
activities. Choosing simple responsive actions is considered to be sufficient as long as the 
detection   mechanism   does   its  job  to  detect  attacks.  However,  with    technological  
1
improvements and creative thinking on the part of attackers, it is likely that more 
sophisticated deception techniques will need to be employed to successfully thwart cyber 
attacks. 
Michael et al. [1,2] investigates the feasibility of applying deception in intrusion 
detection systems and introduced an abstraction, called intelligent software decoy, to 
demonstrate both theoretical and practical applications of deception in software-intensive 
systems. An intelligent software decoy is an abstraction for protecting objects within a 
component-based architecture from egregious and malicious use of their methods and 
interfaces. Deception is used to simultaneously make the intruders believe that they have 
been successful in accessing methods and interfaces, and permit the decoys to gather 
information about the intrusions. The concept covers a wide range of research topics 
including implementing military deception tactics in cyber space, developing deceptions, 
using kernel-based modules for intrusion detection and response capabilities, and 
developing a high-level specification language for specifying both detection and response 
rules. 
Our focus in this thesis is on developing a deception-based intrusion detection and 
response architecture (DB-IDRA), with the intent to do the following: select an 
architectural representation for the DB-IDRA, and construct the architecture so that it can 
support a wide range of architectural frameworks.  
The architecture that we settled on has the following characteristics. The 
architecture combines intrusion detection and deceptive response mechanism in a 
uniform structure. Responses are automated to minimize human interaction with the 
system. The DB-IDRA uses kernel-based software modules to detect attack sequences 
and respond to those attacks. To improve the survivability of the architecture, detection 
and response capabilities are distributed across the entire domain. To minimize the effect 
of defensive activities on the performance of the services provided by the system to 
legitimate users, DB-IDRA employs a mechanism to observe the global state and keep 
the system functioning within predefined tolerances. The architecture is based on a 
dynamic adaptation and evolution process to fulfill the abovementioned tasks. Global 
policy and doctrine are used to govern the behavior of the detection and response system. 
2
The conclusions to be drawn from this research are mostly based on the 
architectural representation of a deception-based intrusion detection and response system. 
Architectural representation provides a consistent and comprehensive definition of the 
problem domain for future work that might refine or extend our findings. We proposed a 
means to incorporate deception into software-intensive systems as an active component. 
However, deception still presents complicated aspects that require more research 
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II. DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
A. CYBER SECURITY 
Information warfare consists of those actions intended to protect, 
exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information or information resources in 
order to achieve a significant advantage, objective, or victory over an 
adversary.  [8] 
 
The preceding definition identifies the responsibilities of the information warriors. 
Information along with the computing resources has value to both their rightful owners 
and the rogue actors (a.k.a attackers). The owners can use either defensive or offensive 
means to protect their information and computing resources from being compromised.  
Likewise, the attacker will use offensive means to gain illicit access to these resources, 
while using defensive means in case the response of an owner is offensive in nature. In 
theory, defense can be more challenging than offense because defense entails protecting 
against all technically feasible vulnerabilities. Conversely, offense involves targeting 
specific vulnerabilities.  
Information warfare has an impact on national security, from the well being of 
individual citizens and organizations (e.g., loss of confidentiality of tax identification 
numbers), to the security of nation states (e.g., compromise of the computers that control 
either the distribution of electricity within North America or the launching of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)). As in kinetic-type warfare, there are laws, 
treaties, and other types of rules that place constraints on combatant actors’ use of 
defensive and offensive tactics and strategies:  violation of these rules would result in an 
actor being accused of war crimes. There are also laws and codes of conduct that pertain 
to the civilian actors in their use of defensive and offensive measures [5].  Although the 
“good guys” are often operating in a defensive mode, this is not necessarily the case. For 
instance, the Allies’ victory in the Gulf War in 1991 was the culmination of their 
application of both defensive and offensive information warfare [9].  
5
There is a wide spectrum of tools and techniques for conducting offensive 
information warfare. These may include simple social engineering ploys intended to trick 
or coerce legitimate users of computing resources into disclosing passwords or 
cryptographic keys. Alternatively, they may be in the form of fully automated attack 
programs (e.g., malicious cooperating agents). On the defensive side, there exists a 
spectrum of tools and techniques for protecting computing resources, such as simple 
intrusion detection systems and systems that have an integrated detection-and-response 
capability. While defense against known tactics and strategies for attacks can be difficult 
to provide for, it is even more difficult to reengineer and apply defenses to address the 
continual emergence of previously unknown tactics and strategies of attack in a timely 
manner. This is part of the reason that conventional intrusion detection and simple 
response techniques have been ineffective against many real-world cyber attacks, such as 
the recent Sapphire worm [10]. Thus, as a defender, one needs some way of rapidly 
detecting new types (including variations on existing) attacks and deploying defensive 
measures to counter these attacks. 
B. INTRUSION DETECTION 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to discover intrusions on a 
computing system or the misuse of a computing system, and often these systems fail to 
differentiate between malicious actions of an attacker versus the egregious (e.g., 
mistyping one’s password or accidentally trying to run a user process in kernel space) use 
of these resources by legitimate users [1]. Either case may cause a denial of service to 
legitimate users (known as the false-positive problem). In an ever-changing world of 
cyber security, the defenders of computing resources often rely on IDS as a means of 
forward first line of defense. In general, there are two primary tasks associated with 
intrusion detection: data collection and detection. Some of the desired properties for an 
IDS, as listed in [11], are the following:  
• Accuracy: IDS must differentiate between a legitimate action in a system 
environment from an anomaly or a misuse, which relates to false positive 
and false negative issues. 
• Performance: IDS must provide sufficiently high-level of performance 
while not introducing an unacceptable level of overhead on the system 
being protected. 
• Completeness: While completeness emphasize that the IDS should not fail 
to detect an intrusion, this is very difficult in practice, because there is no 
global information about the attacks, which also includes past, present and 
future data. 
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• Fault tolerance: IDS must be resistant to faults caused by the 
environment. Most of the time, IDS sit on top of commercially available 
operating systems and interact with third-party tools, potentially 
increasing the vulnerability of the overall system. 
• Timeliness: IDS must perform the analysis as quickly as possible. The 
countermeasures against a detected attack must be initiated before the 
attack would damage a system resource or IDS itself. 
There are three typical approaches to intrusion detection: misuse, anomaly, and 
signature-based (a.k.a., specification-based) detection. Anomaly detection models normal 
or intended system behavior. Deviations from the model represent probable anomalies in 
the system [12]. There are challenges in this approach: defining what is “normal” 
behavior of a system and updating the model of normal or abnormal behavior for 
dynamic and complex environments. Anomaly detection can be used to detect previously 
unknown attacks, but is known to often result in high rates of false positives being 
generated.  
In contrast, misuse detection defines behavior patterns and uses those 
specifications to locate any evidence of known attacks [13]. Specification rules are 
matched against the system audit data, thus, producing few false positives, but may result 
in a high rate of missed detections (i.e., events that should have been flagged as intrusions 
or misuses but were not). As the new types of attacks manifest themselves, the signature 
database needs to be updated.  
The specification-based approach tries to address the weaknesses of misuse 
detection [14]. Instead of describing the events occurring in known attacks, a 
specification-based approach defines a program’s intended behavior; then, deviations 
from that behavior can be flagged as suspicious behavior. This enables detection of 
previously unknown attacks and minimizes false positives. Additionally, with the 
retained precision of misuse detection, initiating immediate defensive actions is possible 
as violations are detected. 
The shortcomings of existing IDS can be summarized under four different topics 
[15]: 
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• Variants: Attack signatures are defined in response to known attacks; 
however, the difficulty here is that attack sequences are often changed 
easily and new exploits are defined over the known ones.  
• False positives:  In defining the signatures or the behavior models to be 
used in IDS, the effort usually falls on the side of alerting too often rather 
than not enough. Filtering is a possible solution, but the risk of potentially 
missing an attack still stands as an open issue.  
• False negatives: A false negative occurs when the system allows an actual 
intrusive action to pass as a non-intrusive behavior. This can be more 
serious than false positives because it gives a misleading sense of security.  
• Data overload. This problem includes collection and analysis of the data. 
Collecting the right data and collecting the right amount of data results in 
a trade-off between performance overhead and effectiveness.  
There are other challenging problems with current IDS such as identifying 
distributed attacks. IDS might fail to identify individual system events as malicious when 
analyzing the data from a single sensor. However a more comprehensive analysis of 
network activity could reveal an attack pattern, not only for a single network domain but 
also across domains. 
C. INTRUSION RESPONSE 
Increasingly, military and civilian information systems are becoming globally 
interconnected, thus tying their fates together (in terms of the effects of cyber attacks on 
any one system) on the security of the global domain. To address what might be called 
“composed vulnerabilities”, a three-tier approach can be followed: protect, detect, and 
react. [16] The first two steps (protect and detect) have been explored extensively in the 
research community. For example, simple mechanisms such as encryption, firewalls, and 
authentication provide protection to some extent. Automated detection systems further 
filter message traffic for intrusions as mentioned in the previous section. Reacting to 
attacks is a relatively new subject focusing on techniques to prevent attacks from 
damaging the system and collecting information about the nature of those attacks. 
Two primary reaction categories are introduced in [17]: discrete administrative 
actions, and security policy reconfiguration. Discrete actions include but are not limited 
to terminating connections, killing processes, and blocking certain communication 
channels. On the other hand, the second category (security policy reconfiguration) 
focuses on reducing the risk of further penetrations in dynamic environments, due to the 
fact that the systems usually are not designed with dynamic security in mind. Although 
this categorization presents different alternatives for intrusion response, these measures 
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are not always practical to deploy. Most of the time-responsive actions conflict with the 
intended system behavior and quality of service (QoS) because of the risk of deploying 
false and inappropriate responses. 
Somayaji [18] introduces a delay-based intrusion response approach intended to 
defeat buffer-overflow attacks. This is accomplished by delaying suspicious system calls. 
However, this approach can adversely affect the level of performance and QoS for 
legitimate users. For example, in case of false positives, the delays could slow reaction or 
response time of the operating system to legitimate user requests. Furthermore, as the 
intensity of suspicious system behavior increases, the delay is more likely to introduce a 
performance overhead in general. 
Survivable Autonomic Response Architecture (SARA) introduced by 
Lewandowski et al. [19] uses coordinated autonomic responses for defending information 
systems. Responses are generated automatically by a system without real-time human 
intervention, which rely on human knowledge and a policy that is programmed into the 
system in advance. As shown in Figure II.1, responses are selected based on either local 
or global system information. Global information is used by an orchestrator to effect 
coordinated responses, whereas local information is used to trigger local responses at the 
Figure II-1 The relation
request of simple coordinators. 
ship of inner- and outer-loop responses (From: [19]) 
 
taking 
While the response systems using local information are able to respond quickly,
global state into consideration increases the effectiveness of the response and 
contributes to the overall defense strategy. However, this kind of coordination depends on 
the efficiency of the analysis mechanisms used for response generation. Since the 
9
analysis mechanisms are based on the system being protected and the potential threats to 
the system, that kind of response architecture should be adaptable to changing internal 
system structures and extensible to new components without disrupting the existing 
architecture. That is, the system should be able to endure modifications to underlying 
behavior without compromising the architecture or framework in which it resides.  





system performance or functionality. Figure II.2 shows how the detection engines 
generated by the offline components are used at runtime. Auditing Specification 
Language (ASL) enables specification of normal and abnormal behaviors of processes as 
logical assertions. Those assertions are based on the sequences of system calls and 
system-call argument values invoked by the processes. ASL specifications are compiled 
into optimized programs for efficient detection of deviations from the specified behavior. 
When discrepancies are detected at runtime, automatic defensive actions – also described 
in ASL – are initiated to contain or isolate the damage.  
Figure II-2 Runtime system for execution of detection engines (From: [20])
he idea of moving both intrusion detection and response actions into the kernel
ew. Some of the advantages attributed to this approach are as follows: firstly, it 
reduces system overhead by avoiding extra context switching; and secondly, it is harder 
for an intruder to tamper with the IDS itself, as the attacker would have to modify the 
kernel to do so. However, there are also some disadvantages. Firstly, kernel-resident 
systems are not easily portable across platforms.  Secondly, a misbehaving kernel module 
can do significant damage, because it has full access to the system [21].  
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For the most part, conventional response capabilities are limited to simple discrete 
administrative actions. The solutions providing more sophisticated techniques are prone 
to not be able to scale to large domains or adapt to dynamic environments. 
D. INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE DECOYS 
An intelligent software decoy is a software abstraction introduced by Michael et 
al. [1] for protecting objects within a component-based architecture from egregious and 
malicious use. In that regard, this paradigm for protection addresses all the steps in the 
three-tiered approach:  Protection and detection mostly benefit from existing work, 
whereas reaction is based on deliberately deceptive responses. The main objective of this 
approach is to deceive attackers into thinking that their attacks have succeeded while 
simultaneously protecting the key components (or assets) of the system and learning 
about the nature of the attacks. 
Deception-based approaches involve many levels of sophistication in terms of 
detection and response over that provided by conventional IDSs. Conventional IDS 
respond to attacks with primitive types of actions, which eventually indicate to attackers 
that they have been detected, likely causing the attackers to change their strategies and 
tactics:  This leaves little if any opportunity for the defender to learn about the attack 
strategies and tactics. In contrast, automated deception-based responses can be used to 
engage the attacker for as long as possible to gather information about the nature of the 
attack (e.g., behavior pattern, impact on the system, and origin). Deceptive responses can 
be automated much like the attacks. Such responses can be effective because attackers 
depend on the honesty of the computer systems they attack. Deception can confuse the 
attackers’ planning or frustrate them for a while without indicating that their attack has 
been detected. This could be especially important during intensive information warfare 
when terrorists attempt to bring down critical systems in a short period of time: Delaying 
intrusive processes gives the IDS time to analyze the attack and plan a response. 
Deception also allows for turning an attacker’s own strengths of patience and 
determination against the attcaker, much as is done in the defensive martial art known as 
Aikido [37]. 
Michael et al. [2] proposed a high-level architecture for software decoys, shown 
in Figure II.3. The architecture is based on instrumentation of kernel libraries and log 
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monitors available on a chosen platform. The basic instrumentation provides for the 
detection of events and event attributes specified in the generic behavior model and the 
interface for executing monitoring programs. A specialized compiler will generate 
monitoring programs from a high-level language, such as CHAMELEON [3], for 
specifying both detection and response rules for carrying out deceptions. Below is a rule 
combining an event pattern with an action, represented in CHAMELEON. The rule 
specifies that each time a read event is detected, and the buffer contains the string “SITE 
EXEC”, then the value “NOOP” should be assigned to the buffer. This rule is used in a 
case study, reported in [3], to detect and respond to an attack against Washington 
University’s ftp server (wu-ftpd), which uses the SITE EXEC command to gain root 
privileges [42]. 
detect x: read & post (buf(x) == “SITE EXEC”) 
   from execute-program do buf(x) = “NOOP”  
Figure II-3 High-level software decoy architecture (From: [2]) 
In the software-decoy architecture, the supervisor coordinates the actions among 
the decoyed-enabled components in order to make decisions on how best to instrument 
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components given the latest information about component interaction and selected 
responses – conforming to information operations doctrine and policy – to effect system-
wide deception strategies. In that regard, the decoy approach has in common some of the 
founding goals of the SARA architecture (described in the previous section), such as 
rapid and coordinated responses to patterns of suspicious system events. 
Software components are wrapped with decoy functionality on a selective basis: 
Wrapping can be performed at more than one level of abstraction from application-level 
objects such as web applets to low-level operating system calls. This provides a level of 
flexibility in coordinating the overall system strategy dynamically as characteristics and 
intensity of threats change. If any of the assertions (e.g., preconditions, postconditions, or 
invariants) built into the behavioral model for the system are violated, the software decoy 
isolates the interaction with the intrusive process into an antechamber to further analyze 
the process’ real intention and apply, if necessary, deceptive responses to gather 
information. The antechamber is either hosted by the operational system on which the 
software decoy resides, or on a separate processor or platform in order to minimize the 
effect of the monitoring and decoy actions (e.g., those of delay tactics) on the availability 
and performance of computing resources requested by legitimate users of the decoy-
enabled software components. 
Figure II-4 illustrates a possible scenario, in which the protected system is under a 
buffer overflow attack. The main components in this diagram are the wrappers, 
supervisor and repository of detection rules and decoy actions. The software component 
is wrapped by decoys with the purpose of both detecting buffer overflow attacks and 
responding back to those attacks with system delays. When a malicious request is made 
to the component, which violates the contract specifications, the buffer-overflow-wrapper 
passes the intrusion/misuse information in the form of event traces to the supervisor. 
Then, the supervisor analyzes the situation based on the rules included in the repository 
and selects a response strategy. This strategy should conform not only to local scope, but 
also to the global system state and the defense strategy. Based on the analysis results, the 
supervisor invokes pre-programmed decoy actions in the wrappers and installs new 
wrappers to change the granularity of monitoring if necessary. In this particular scenario, 
13
the supervisor invokes a wrapper to delay the malicious process for a finite period of 
time, possibly determined using some form of counter planning [7].  
Figure II-4 Decoy interaction with a buffer overflow attack (After: [6]) 
The salient features of the decoy approach can be summarized as follows: 
• Deception as a response strategy. Traditional warfare and military tactics 
presents many opportunities that can also be applied in the cyber world. 
Deception also increases the range of responses from the production of a 
fake error message to the simulation of the whole operating system. 
Another benefit is collecting information about the attacks, which enables 
better preparation for future attack scenarios. 
• Dynamic configuration. As the context changes, it is possible to update 
the structure of defensive components for both detection and response 
purposes and reconfigure the overall strategy according to the decoy 
policy and doctrine. 
• Automated response. Unlike most of the intrusion detection systems, 
software decoys integrate detection and response mechanisms within a 
single automated framework. This reduces the need for human 
intervention at runtime. While having some disadvantages, kernel-based 
detection and response provides fast and efficient mechanisms to confront 
the attacks before they potentially damage the system. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS  
A. OVERVIEW 
Software-intensive systems require an organized approach for the creation, 
analysis, and maintenance of architectural design. An architectural design is defined in 
terms of architectural abstractions, such as patterns, styles and views. The way 
architectures are designed has been evolving towards a more challenging and complex 
process, because mapping the real-world problems into a software domain requires more 
and more multifaceted considerations, particularly related to complexity and new 
technological developments. To overcome this challenge in system development, 
architectural design provides a transition from the user world (e.g., domain, requirements 
and risk analysis) into software-related abstractions (e.g., software components, 
connectors, interfaces) by describing the elements of the system and how they work 
together to fulfill the system’s requirements. 
Architectural design activities are usually separated into different views. Each 
view addresses one or more of the concerns of the system and the stakeholders; therefore, 
a view refers to the expression of a system’s architecture with respect to a particular set 
of conventions by which a view is created, depicted, and analyzed [22]. Although there is 
no common approach in separating architecture into different views, the main reason 
behind multiple views is to be able to manage complexity.  
 
Figure III-1 The "4+1" view model. (From: [23]) 
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In the literature, there are several approaches explicitly treating different views of 
architecture. The 4+1 approach, by Kruchten, describes software architecture using five 
concurrent views: logical, process, physical, developmental, and scenarios. As         
Figure III.1 shows, each view addresses a specific set of concerns of interest to different 
stakeholders in the system [23]. Hofmeister et al. used a four-view model, as shown in 
Figure III.2, describing the architecture from four different structures: conceptual, 
module, execution, and code. The four-view model is the result of a search for 
commonalities across domains and underlying principles that lead to good and useful 
software architectures [24]. 
 
Figure III-2  The four views of software architecture (From: [43]) 
The main goal of architectural views is to articulate different aspects of the 
system in a loosely coupled and highly cohesive way. Considering that principle, both of 
the models provide a tenable solution to the problem, while preserving their distinct 
characteristics. However, the essence of using a view model is that it should provide such 
a level granularity that the designers could define the system properties clearly within the 
scope of each view. Most of the time, achieving such granularity is hard due to the 
complexity of a problem domain. That is why, existing view models may need to be 
modified according to the characteristics of the problem. For example, an architecture for 
a web-based shopping application presents different characteristics than an application in 
the computer security domain.  
For intelligent software decoys, the problem domain is not fully explored yet. For 
example, incorporating deceptive responses in an intrusion detection framework is a 
relatively new subject, and the effects of both defensive and offensive deception on a 
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cyber domain are not well-understood. Our architectural design process is intended to 
provide a generic framework to be used to demonstrate the feasibility of deception-based 
intrusion detection and response approaches. For the required level of abstraction, we 
want to explore the domain in two views: conceptual and module. The conceptual view 
enables us to explore the concept, whereas the module view allows us to map the 
conceptual view to the actual problem in a form of architectural description. Besides 
these two architectural views, it is possible to enhance our view of the system by 
decomposing the problem into its major subcomponents: monitoring, intrusion detection, 
intrusion response, analysis, and planning. Figure III.3 represents the architecture views 
based on both the architectural abstractions and major subcomponents of the system. 
Figure III-3 Architectural views for intrusion detection and response 
framework 
The decomposition of the entire problem domain allows us to investigate sub 
areas independent of each other. This introduces a simplified view of the system. 
Monitoring includes data collection and observation tasks. Based on these data, analysis 
provides the required decision-making capability for both intrusion detection and 
response mechanisms. On the other hand, planning involves the required set of rules for 
governing all the other tasks. Planning uses both low-level rules defining atomic actions 
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(e.g., response actions, detection patterns) and high-level rules defining the global 
defense strategy (e.g., policy, doctrine). 
B. DEVELOPMENT PHASES 
Developing the architecture for a deception-based intrusion detection and 
response framework is a complex problem. Major steps in this development process are 
understanding the problem, exploring the domain for possible approaches, finding and 
elaborating the requirements, conceptualizing the problem, mapping the conceptual view 
into architectural abstractions, and developing the detailed architecture. Regardless of its 
complexity, it is possible to solve the problem in a “grand-design” approach; however, 
there are some significant risks associated with this approach. A better way is to separate 
the development into phases, and follow a incremental iterative approach such as the 
Rational Unified Process [39]. For this purpose, we use a three-phase process to develop 
the architecture defining the activities from requirements through to detailed architectural 
design: plan and elaborate, high-level system definition, and detailed architectural 
design. 
1. Plan and Elaborate 
The Plan and Elaborate phase includes the initial concept exploration, 
investigation of possible approaches, planning, specification of requirements, and 
developing use cases. At the end of this phase, we expect to define “what problem we are 
trying to solve.” Understanding the problem is essential, because the requirements and 
the design will be built on top of this definition. Then, the fundamental requirements will 
be expressed and scenarios will be developed to further elaborate these requirements. 
This phase will generate the functional and non-functional requirements and the use 
cases. 
2. High-Level System Definition 
The High-level System Definition phase uses the artifacts generated in the 
previous phase and starts building the system. The essence of this phase is to leave out 
the low-level design details and focus on the high-level aspects of the system, including 
major components and their collaborations. The conceptual model is the primary artifact 
of this phase, which decomposes the problem into meaningful concepts and shows their 
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collaboration. Another artifact is the high-level architectural design, which maps those 
concepts into architectural abstractions, such as components and connectors. 
3. Detailed Architectural Design 
The Detailed Architectural Design phase defines the architecture in a sufficient 
level of detail including subcomponent, interface, and system behavior specifications. 
The essence of the detailed architecture is that it integrates the functional and non-
functional requirements into the system structure. Although the implementation details 
are excluded at this stage, the architecture should provide an unambiguous approach, 
which will support implementation-level activities later on. 
C. A MODELING TOOL: UML 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a standard language for writing 
software blueprints. The UML can be used to visualize, specify, construct, 
and document the artifacts of a software intensive system [25]. 
 
The role of software architecture in software-intensive system design is important 
and, as those systems become more sophisticated and larger, architectures become 
increasingly essential for understanding, managing and describing their complexity. 
While the benefits of architectural design are obvious, there are several shortfalls in the 
representation of architectures [26]. The ad-hoc and informal approaches to architectural 
design present several significant challenges to be overcome. 
• Architectural designs are often poorly understood and not amenable to 
formal analysis or simulation.  
• Architectural design decisions are based more on default than on solid 
engineering principles.  
• Architectural constraints assumed in the initial design are not enforced as 
the system evolves.  
• There are few tools to help the architectural designers with their tasks 
[27]. 
In an effort to address these challenges, a level of formalism is required for 
describing architectures, and therefore, supporting overall software development lifecycle 
efforts. That level of formalism can be achieved through various ways, including 
programming languages, module interconnection languages, interface definition 
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languages, and architecture description languages (ADL) [28]. Approaches other than 
ADLs fall short in representing architectural abstractions for several reasons: 
• They are defined to represent low-level constructs, which is not adequate 
for architectural abstractions. 
• They cannot represent reusable architectural patterns. 
• They address specific problem domains; therefore, extendibility of those 
methods is low. 
• They mostly focus on the static structure of the systems, and hence, the 
dynamic behavior of systems cannot be described sufficiently. 
On the other hand, ADLs are used to define and model system architectures prior 
to implementation. Besides static structures of systems, they also address system 
functionality, interactions between components, and interfaces. There are numerous 
ADLs, such as Rapide, Wright, ACME, UniCon, and MetaH. Detailed information about 
ADLs can be obtained from [29].  
The capabilities of UML are limited when compared to ADLs. However, the rich 
set of tools provided by UML supports the representation of software systems. The main 
advantage of UML is its wide acceptance within the software engineering community: It 
provides a lingua franca for communication among designers, architects, and other. 
While the notations in UML present many alternatives in describing the implementation 
of a system, using the same kind of notations in architectural design blurs the distinction 
between implementation and architecture views. For example, UML provides only 
interaction diagrams for describing the dynamic properties of a system and using these 
diagrams in both implementation and architecture views may create confusion. 
Considering the pros and cons, UML is well suited for the purpose of our study. 
Our main goal is to be able to represent the architecture in an understandable way. The 
power of UML for representing the conceptual design and static structure of a system 
allows us to visualize our ideas in an efficient and organized way. UML also provides 
“lightweight extension mechanisms” – stereotypes, tagged values, and constraints – that 
can be used to enhance the language with architectural definitions. Further discussion of 
the applicability of using UML to describe software architectures can be found in [30] 
and [31]. 
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IV. PLAN AND ELABORATE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Plan and elaborate is the first step in the developments process and the main 
purpose of this phase is concept exploration. The requirements produced in this step 
constitute the foundation for architectural design activities. We explored the domain in 
two ways: by capturing the high-level requirements and then modeling those 
requirements with use cases to gain a better understanding about the system. This phase 
produces the entities involved in the system and the interactions between those entities.  
1. Requirements 
Requirements analysis, for our problem domain, covers the high-level 
functionality and associated non-functional aspects of the system. We used two primary 
resources for requirements elaboration: project group meetings and related literature. In 
that regard, we explored the computer science literature in related areas such as intrusion 
detection approaches, runtime code instrumentation, kernel-based software modules, and 
deceptive strategies.  
The set of requirements, developed in this phase, represent the key functional and 
non-functional features of the system. Without going into implementation detail, we 
defined what is really needed for the system in a clear form. Requirements are generally 
described in textual format. They fall short in visualizing the relations between the 
system and its users. For that reason, we augmented the requirements with use cases, in 
which we were able to make readily visible the fundamental behavioral aspects of the 
system.  
2. Use Cases 
Every system consists of a set of sub components and a set of interactions either 
internally or externally. Use cases provide a view to describe the behavior of the system 
as seen by its end users. This view focuses on the aspects that outline the system’s 
architecture. Use cases are based on the actors that the system interacts with, the roles of 
these actors, and how they interact with the system. Additionally, use cases specify the 
behavior of a system or a part of a system, and are descriptions of a set of sequences of 
actions, including variants, that a system performs to yield an observable result or value 
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to an actor [25]. In that regard, we developed a use case model to capture the intended 
behavior of the system and augment the requirements. 
B. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS  
1. Intrusion Detection 
Deception-based intrusion detection and response architecture (DB-IDRA) 
combines both intrusion detection and response in a single structure. As described in 
section II.B, there are three common techniques to intrusion detection: anomaly, misuse, 
and signature-based. Although there are specific concerns associated with each 
technique, DB-IDRA provides a generic framework in which any intrusion detection 
approach can be integrated. The point is that the intrusion detection and response 
mechanisms should be able to communicate with each other as defined by the 
architecture. In any case, the architecture should specify the necessary components along 
with the data structures. 
2. Deception-based Response 
DB-IDRA uses a deceptive defense strategy for intrusion response. The main 
objective in this approach is to be able to deploy deceptive tactics against intrusions to 
gather as much information as about the nature of the attack. The spectrum of possible 
tactics needs to cover a wide range from mimicking of normal system behavior through 
inventing of fake activities to attract the attacker’s attention. The appropriateness and 
effectiveness of the deceptive tactics depends on the situation, including the intensity of 
conflicts, the value of the information being protected, and the threat level of attacks. 
Additionally, deception strategies should not introduce an unreasonable performance 
overhead on the system. 
3. Automated Response  
DB-IDRA integrates the automated response functionality in the architecture to 
realize deception-based defense strategies. It should be capable of making decisions and 
performing actions that help the system accomplish its mission much more quickly and 
accurately than a human could. Capabilities for specifying automated response actions 
must be invoked as intrusions are detected, which provides damage prevention and 
containment. This functionality also minimizes the constant involvement of human 
experts in runtime activities. 
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4. Runtime and Offline Analysis 
Combining intrusion detection and response in a uniform framework increases the 
performance overhead due to the complex decision-making process.  The analysis 
mechanism is grouped into two layers: runtime and offline.  
• Runtime analysis supports the decision-making capabilities for detecting 
and responding to attacks, and maintaining an acceptable level of system 
performance. The main concerns are: (i) fast and efficient detection with 
false positive rates, (ii) maintaining the consistency of the defense strategy 
against the global policy and doctrine, and (iii) maintaining the system 
performance by observing the system state. 
• Offline analysis involves analyzing the past data and improving the system 
for detection and response approaches (e.g., addition of new response 
actions and new attack specifications), high-level policy and doctrine rules 
(e.g., switching from defensive to offensive countermeasures), and system 
functionality (e.g., addition of the capability to trace the origin of attacks). 
5. Kernel-based Detection and Response Modules 
Kernel-based operations avoid overhead caused by extra context switching. 
However kernel-resident implementation introduces a level of complexity in management 
and configuration of entities inside the kernel and also has an impact on the host 
behavior. These problems can be addressed by a careful design approach. DB-IDRA uses 
kernel-based modules to detect attack sequences and respond to those attacks. It should 
also provide means to modify these modules dynamically. Ko et al. discusses the 
feasibility and practicality of in-kernel intrusion detection and introduced the Generic 
Software Wrapper Toolkit as the basis for implementing kernel-resident intrusion 
detectors in [32] and [33]. 
6. Distributed Detection and Response Capabilities 
DB-IDRA should distribute detection and response capabilities across the entire 
domain to eliminate single-point of vulnerability. The advantage here is that doctrine and 
policy developed for systems could be integrated into larger joint information operations 
and be distributed throughout the cooperative engagement grid [6]. 
7. System Performance Maintenance 
While protecting a system against intrusions, performance overhead could 
degrade the level of service provided by the system to legitimate users. DB-IDRA will 
include a mechanism to observe the global state and keep the system functioning within 
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predefined tolerances. For example, as the intensity of conflict increases, sustaining 
interactions requires more system resources and eventually causes degradation of system 
performance. In order to address this problem, a set of system variables can be monitored 
at runtime, such as the load of malicious interactions on the network. If this load is 
beyond a predefined threshold value, then necessary measures would be taken to keep the 
system stable. 
8. Dynamic Adaptation and Evolution 
Dynamic environments require a system to adjust its behavior at runtime. This 
kind of an adjustment can be achieved in two successive steps: 
• Observing the system’s behavior and analyzing the observations to 
determine appropriate adaptations, and 
• Carrying out these adaptations in such a way that the system protects its 
consistency and integrity. 
DB-IDRA should include such mechanisms to provide addition, removal, or 
replacement of components (e.g., adding new sensors), and modifications to the 
configuration of components (e.g., response actions and defense strategies). 
9. Global Defense Policy and Doctrine 
Global policy and doctrine are required to govern the behavior of the detection 
and response system. Policy and doctrine represent a set of high-level rules indicating 
essential properties (e.g., appropriateness, limitations, course of actions, and so on) that a 
defensive strategy should conform to. For example, an administrative domain may be 
bounded to specific legal regulations and is able to deploy only defensive actions against 
adversaries, whereas another domain may extend its defense strategies to be more 
offensive. This also indicates that these rules are dynamic in nature and can be modified 
according to the domain-specific scenarios. 
C. NON-FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Interoperability 
Interoperability, within the context of intrusion detection and response systems, 
represents the need for effective communication and collaboration among different 
administrative domains. While sharing the common purpose of protecting their domains 
via efficient mechanisms, those administrative domains are independent from each other. 
What they need is a strong collaboration that will allow them to update their own security 
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measures and inform the other domains about ongoing security-related events and their 
results. For an effective communication, timeliness and security of the information is 
critical. The ultimate goal of interoperability is to provide the necessary means to 
establish this collaboration scheme. 
2. Stability 
Stability, in general, is the property of a system ensuring that the system will 
remain within defined and recognizable limits against disturbances. Resilience is another 
concept defining stability in two dimensions: (i) how a system behaves in order to 
maintain stability within a specific stability domain (i.e., engineering resilience), and (ii) 
the intensity of disturbances that can force a system into a different stability domain  (i.e., 
ecological resilience) [34].  
Based on these two definitions, stability of an intrusion detection and response 
system mainly focuses on the disturbances from the environment, and the defined and 
recognizable limits for the system behaviors. Besides defining these key elements for the 
system, it is also necessary to evaluate the stability under varying levels of intensity of 
conflict to guarantee the system operates as intended. 
3. Scalability 
DB-IDRA represents a total defense strategy consisting of single host to network-
wide and inter-domain protection. Implementing this hierarchical strategy requires a 
scalable architecture. As the size and complexity of the domain increases, the intended 
use of the system must behave as defined and critical system properties must be 
preserved. For example, logical groups of individual hosts may implement a common 
deception strategy and also need to cooperate with a different administrative domain. One 
of the requirements for that strategy is for a central unit to manage the global defense 
strategy and inter- and intra-domain communication paths. 
4. Survivability 
DB-IDRA has a critical mission to protect software systems against attacks in 
bounded time. In the presence of threats against the system, DB-IDRA must be able to 
remain operational throughout the mission. This is the issue of survivability. 
Furthermore, mechanisms must not introduce additional vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited to degrade the survivability of the system.  
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In the first case, survivability scope is limited to the incidents caused by attacks. 
However, survivability is also subject to vulnerabilities caused by failures and accidents 
that are not necessarily related to attacks. Policy decisions related to survivability can 
change continuously according to system context; it is even possible to observe evolution 
of survivability in a particular system as problems occur and are handled, mission 
objectives change, and the intensity and load of the environment changes.  
The second case is the focal point for maintaining DB-IDRA’s own survivability. 
Essential functionalities and properties in decoy mechanisms must be maintained in order 
for providing continuous protection. Even in case of failures or attacks, DB-IDRA must 
behave in accordance with the mission objectives. Distributed capabilities can address 
this issue to some extent. 
5. Effectiveness 
Protecting a system from cyber attacks is a challenging task in its own right. 
Combining this task with a sophisticated response mechanism makes this task even more 
challenging. This combination requires a set of rules for both detection patterns and 
decoy actions. Representation of these rules requires the use of a sufficient level of 
formalism, as the rules must be precise and concise in their representation. Even small 
ambiguities in rule definitions may cause some security holes in systems; that is why, a 
continuous evaluation of the general system state is necessary for the effectiveness of the 
system. It is also possible that a set of rules considered to be efficient in one scenario may 
turn out to be inadequate in another scenario. New types of threats to information systems 
introduce the need for new measures to be taken, as well.  
Effectiveness has two different views regarding the mentioned facts: providing 
effectiveness and maintaining effectiveness. Although it is necessary to provide an 
effective mechanism to facilitate the desired defensive strategy, situations such as those 
mentioned above could force a change of context that forces the system to operate 
ineffectively. Evaluation of the system state is, therefore, important to locate these 
inefficiencies. The system should also provide a set of corrective actions to recover from 
those ineffective states. 
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6. Performance 
Performance is a general constraint over all the functional and non-functional 
requirements. Means must be provided to minimize the affect of the monitoring and 
decoy actions (e.g., those of delay tactics) on the availability and performance of 
computing resources requested by legitimate users of the protected software components. 


























Figure IV-1 High-level use case diagram for DB-IDRA 
Figure IV-1 shows the use case diagram for DB-IDRA. The diagram includes the 
fundamental system functionality such as monitoring, intrusion detection, deceptive 
responses and analysis capabilities. Each ellipse represents an individual use case 
describing a set of actions that the system performs to yield an observable result. Stick 
figures represent the roles that users play when interacting with the use cases. The 
associations between the actors and use cases show that they communicate with one 
another, possibly sending and receiving messages. While use cases can be organized by 
specifying generalization, include, and extend relationships, in this specific use case 
diagram, there are only include relationships between use cases. This type of relation 
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means that the base use case (e.g., respond to attacks) explicitly incorporates the behavior 
of another use case (e.g., apply deception). 
1. Initiate Attack 
Actors  : Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
Description : DB-IDRA protects a software component from cyber attacks. 
Therefore the basic assumption is that there are intrusive actions against the protected 
entity. Not only individual attackers initiate those intrusions, but also organized groups 
conduct attacks on systems depending on their value, and criticality. The complexity of 
those attacks can range from simple scripts to distributed attacks. Those attacks usually 
try to invoke unauthorized queries and attempt to modify data or processes. While the 
origin and purpose of attacks are important to some extent, intensity of attacks presents 
another significant problem for counter-measures.  
2. Monitor System Activity 
Actors  : DB-IDRA, Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
Description : Monitoring is the first step in observing the activities on a 
system. Monitoring is used to observe events and system parameters for intrusion 
detection and system performance purposes. Monitoring usually perturbs system 
performance by consuming system resources such as CPU or storage. Minimizing this 
overhead is, therefore, necessary for an efficient real-time intrusion detection and 
response framework. Monitoring is divided into layers to analyze various components 
involved in monitoring process: observation, collection, analysis, presentation, 
interpretation, console, and management [35]. For our problem domain, monitoring 
covers the first two layers in this sequence. The observation layer gathers raw data on 
individual components of the system, and the collection layer collects data from different 
observers. This approach introduces a hierarchy of sensors focusing on different aspects 
of the system being monitored. Besides an organized structure, this approach also allows 
for systematic use of monitoring, such as turning off some observers, modifying some 
aspects of the observers, and reconfiguring the hierarchy.  
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 3. Perform Runtime and Offline Analysis 
Actors  : DB-IDRA 
Type  : Primary 
Description : Analysis is performed at two levels: runtime and offline. Runtime 
analysis is done for evaluating the system state and making decisions about intrusions 
and responses. Runtime analysis governs the dynamic behavior of the system. On the 
other hand, offline analysis works on system audit that is recorded at runtime and 
evaluates how well the system performed its mission. This evaluation concentrates on the 
performance and effectiveness of the system and also finds deficiencies, abnormalities, or 
suspicious events, if any, related to intrusion detection rules and response actions. 
Evaluation results can be used as a means for process improvement. 
4. Detect Intrusions 
Actors  : DB-IDRA, Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
Description :  Every attack follows a specific behavior pattern, and DB-IDRA 
employs an intrusion detection mechanism to match behavior patterns against a central 
shared database of detection rules at runtime. DB-IDRA introduces a level of flexibility 
to use any kind of detection technique. While some simple attack sequences can be 
detected at the observation layer (i.e., decoy wrappers), more sophisticated attacks may 
require further system- and network-wide analysis to draw a final conclusion about the 
nature of the interactions. 
5. Track Intrusions 
Actors  : DB-IDRA, Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
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Description : Once an intrusion is detected in the system, the response 
mechanism isolates it from the system into a different mode. The distinction between 
different operating modes is necessary to keep track of deception-related activities. As 
introduced in [1], when an intrusion is detected, the software decoy switches from its 
nominal operating mode to a deception mode for that particular intrusive process. In the 
deception mode, the interaction with the process is redirected to a construct called an 
antechamber. The antechamber serves as a waiting area for the requests initiated by 
intrusive processes. The software decoy assesses the nature of the attack and generates 
responses while the process is kept in the antechamber. Both attack attempts and 
egregious actions may trigger that transition between operating modes.  
6. Respond to Attacks 
Actors  : DB-IDRA, Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
Description : DB-IDRA includes both intrusion detection an response 
functionality. The response mechanism requires an efficient detection approach. Ranging 
from simple response actions such as terminating the connection, to sophisticated 
responses like deception, there is a wide range of possibility to realize responsive 
strategies. The complexity of responses is likely to increase the overhead for the system. 
Therefore, feasibility of response approaches turns out to be important. Responses are 
performed by kernel-based wrappers on a selective basis. Criteria for a response must be 
related to the defense policies, system state, and the characteristics of each particular 
attack.  
7. Apply Deception 
Actors  : DB-IDRA, Attacker(s) 
Type  : Primary 
Description : Unlike many primitive intrusion responses, deception is a 
sophisticated approach against cyber attacks, which aims to fool an intruder into 
believing the attack is successful while both gathering information about the nature of 
attacks and protecting the key assets of the system. Some example deceptive responses 
include fake error messages, delays in responses, and lying about the status of the files 




V. HIGH-LEVEL SYSTEM DEFINITION 
A. OVERVIEW 
High-level system definition is the second step in the development process for the 
architectural design of DB-IDRA. This phase is the bridge between initial concept 
exploration and detailed architectural design. This phase takes the artifacts defined in the 
previous step (i.e., requirements and use cases) and produces the conceptual model of the 
system and high-level architectural design, which, in turn, become the input to the 
detailed design phase.   
The conceptual model illustrates the concepts in the problem domain and helps 
understand the problem domain further. The concepts represent the essential entities that 
will eventually act the way in the real world. The conceptual model presents the problem 
domain, abstracted out from design details. Formally, a concept consists of its symbol, 
intension and extension [40]. A concept should have a specific name, a context, a 
definition, and a set of examples to which the concept applies. Associations between the 
concepts show how concepts relate to both the model and other concepts. Typically, it is 
the symbol and intension of a concept that is of practical interest. The intension defines 
the concept with an emphasis on the context that applies to the concept. Modeling starts 
with identifying the concepts, and this can be done via two different techniques. The 
concept category list can be used to provide a list of candidate concepts related to 
different categories, such as physical objects, places, events, and transactions. Another 
approach is based on noun-phrase-identification technique, that is, to identify the noun 
and noun phrases in textual descriptions (e.g., requirements, use cases) of a problem 
domain. Our approach used both techniques to come up with an inclusive list of concepts 
as described in the following section. 
Software architecture is defined as a structural plan that describes the elements of 
a system, how they fit together, and how they work together to fulfill the system’s 
requirements [24]. In order to describe the architecture as software abstractions, there is a 
need to map requirements to architectural entities. The high-level system definition 
combines the artifacts from requirements analysis and conceptual modeling and produces 
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the main entities and the structural organization of the architecture. In phase, the main 
entities are the logical groupings organizing functionally related elements of the system.  
For this study, the main product of high-level design activities is that the architecture is 
decomposed into layers consisting of architecture packages with distinct functionalities. 
B. CONCEPT CATEGORY LIST 
Generation of a concept category list is an intermediate step to find and describe 
the candidate concepts for the architecture’s conceptual model. The concepts are defined 
by their names and intensions. The set of concepts provides for building the domain 
vocabulary and dealing with the complexity at simpler levels of abstraction by using 
decomposition. The following list describes the concepts extracted from the requirements 
and the use cases for DB-IDRA.  
Administrative Domain Administrative domain consists of a number of hosts 
(systems). Domain also represents the entity for which the 
decoy policy is in effect. 
Host Host is an individual computer system that includes 
software components to provide services to its users.  
Software Component Software component is either a complete program or a sub 
program. Software components provide services to system 
users. 
Contract Specification Contract specification represents the formal definition of 
component interfaces. Contract specification consists of 
three sub elements: precondition, postcondition, and class 
invariants.  
System Activity System activity stands for all the interactions taking place 
in a computer system.  
System Event System activity is described by sequences of system events 
(event traces) initiated by the processes in that system. 
Events perform some actions that change the system state. 
System State System state represents the combination of system variables 
and ongoing activities at any given time.  
System Metric System metrics, within the context of software decoys, 
define the nominal system state so that it is possible to 
measure system state against those metrics and determine 
corrective actions. 
Wrapper Wrappers are kernel-based constructs that interact with the 
processes in the system. They are deployed and coordinated 
by the supervisor. They perform the actions that are 
assigned to them.  
Probe Probes collect data about the system state, and pass those 
data to the analysis component. They are different from the 
wrappers in a sense that they do not participate in the 
defensive actions.   
Intrusion Detection Intrusion detection refers to the se of monitors to recognize 
intrusive behaviors. Generally, intrusion detection includes 
response handling, but this study intrusion response is 
considered separately from detection. 
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Intrusion Response Intrusion response refers to actions that are taken after 
attacks are detected. In traditional approach, responses 
address containing and recovering from damages and 
hardening defenses. DB-IDRA extends this scope to also 
include deception-based defense strategies. 
Behavior Pattern Behavior pattern represents sequence of system events. 
Depending on the detection technique deployed in a system, 
patterns define either nominal system behaviors, or attack 
sequences. Each behavior is defined by unique sequence of 
system events. 
Intrusion Intrusions are either malicious (intentional) or egregious 
(unintentional) use of the system resources. Intrusions ask 
for system resources in a sequence, thus, their behavior 
represents a pattern. 
Attacker Attacker is the person who initiates intrusive processes 
against a system. Attackers can be either individuals or 
coordinated groups. Organized attacks can be more 
sophisticated than amateur individual attacks. While 
persistency, and motivations are different for each type of 
attacker, there are commonalities in basic attack techniques 
that are employed. 
System Action System actions optimize the system performance. 
Decoy Action Decoy actions are the embodiment of the defense strategy 
and they are specified in the software wrappers.  
Action Specification Both system and decoy actions are specified in a high-level 
specification language. 
System Log System log stores defense related system activities and is 
used for offline analysis. 
Defense Strategy Deception strategy represents the global defense strategy 
for the overall system. It should conform to decoy policy 
and doctrine. 
Policy / Doctrine Policy and doctrine draw the framework in which the 
domain-based defense strategy is defined. Deception-based 
actions and tactics conform to this framework. 
System Engineer System engineers keep the decoy system operational. 
Although DB-IDRA is mostly automated, system engineers 
analyze the system performance and, if necessary, they 
update specifications for behavior patterns and decoy 
actions manually. 
Table 1 Concept category list 
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C. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The conceptual model in Figure V-2 (on the next page) represents the general 
concepts and their associations with each other. The model represents the functions to be 
performed by the system. The conceptual view in the diagram contains the concepts and 
their relations. The conceptual model does not show the architectural entities; however, it 
Figure V-1 Central functionality of DB-IDRA 
defines how the concepts and relations can be applied to the architecture. 
FigureV-1 repre  on the central 
functio
sents a partial view of the diagram concentrating
nalities of DB-IDRA. The associations in the diagram are bi-directional, meaning 
that from each concept logical traversal to the other is possible. The little arrowheads 
indicate the direction of this logical traversal. Depending on the type of association, it is 
possible to have unidirectional associations. For example, the association between the 
DB-IDRA and Intrusion detection is interpreted as “DB-IDRA provides intrusion 
detection”. On the other hand, the association between DB-IDRA and Software Wrapper 
is bi-directional, indicating data flow from each concept to the other. Software wrappers 
monitor the system activity and send intrusion-related activity reports to DB-IDRA. Then 
DB-IDRA sends back corresponding updates and deploys necessary actions. As a result, 
wrappers perform those actions. The diagram also shows that DB-IDRA provides 
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Figure V-2 Conceptual Model 
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After analyzing the concepts and the relations between them, it is possible to 
make preliminary decisions about the architecture. DB-IDRA should have at a minimum 
the following functionalities.  
1. DB-IDRA should include a flexible intrusion detection mechanism that 
employs either anomaly-, misuse-, or signature-based detection technique. 
2. The DB-IDRA should have an intrusion response mechanism that is based on 
deceptive defense strategy. 
3. Kernel-based software wrappers (decoys) are used to detect and respond to 
attacks. Decoys should be reconfigurable and modifiable dynamically by a 
central decision-making module in order to handle runtime activities. 
4. Deceptive tactics should be realized by decoy actions that are defined 
formally.  
5. The defense-related activities should conform to a global decoy policy and 
doctrine.  
6. While protecting host-based systems from cyber attacks, DB-IDRA should 
provide a defensive approach that must be scalable to a network and also 
should provide an interoperability framework among different administrative 
domains. 
7. Besides intrusion detection and response, DB-IDRA should also take the 
system state into account in order to evaluate the impact of the defense 
activities on the system performance and QoS provided to legitimate users. 
Corrective actions (system actions) to optimize the system performance must 
be defined and integrated into the architecture. 
8. In order to measure the system performance, a set of metrics should be 
defined for the system.  
9. In order to detect intrusions and observe system state, DB-IDRA should 
employ an effective monitoring approach. Effectiveness, in this context, 
consists of timeliness, adaptability and robustness of the monitoring activities.  
10. DB-IDRA requires a formal approach for specifying nominal system 
behavior, intrusion patterns, response actions and system actions.  














D. HIGH-LEVEL ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN  
1. Overview 
After requirements analysis and conceptual modeling, high-level architectural 
design is the first step towards a representation of the architecture in a form of software 
abstractions. Based on the functions defined in the previous section, high-level design 
involves describing the behavioral model for the DB-IDRA and then specifying the 
Figure V-3 High-l
architecture in UML notation. 




These functionalities govern the runtime behavior of the system; therefore, the 
architec
Dynamic Behavior Model 
DB_IDRA includes five high-level func
• Monitoring,  
• Intrusion dete
• Tracking,  
nd  • Analysis, a
• Response.  
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ture needs to be designed considering how the system functions in a dynamic 
environment. Oriezy et al. [36] introduces an approach supporting two simultaneous 
processes to manage the dynamic structure of a system based on its software architecture: 
(i) evolution, the consistent application of change over time, and (ii) adaptation, the cycle 
of detecting changing circumstances and planning and deploying responsive 
modifications. In this approach, explicit consideration is given to the role of software 
architecture in planning, coordinating, monitoring, evaluating, and implementing 
adaptive responses. Figure V-3 defines these two processes and their sub elements. The 
main distinction between the upper and lower portions of the diagram is that adaptation 
management describes the life cycle of adaptive software systems; on the other hand, the 
evolution management describes how adaptations are applied to adaptive software 
systems.  
Although Oriezy et al. defines this approach for self-adaptive software 
architec
to 
•  the intensity and characteristics of intrusions change, it is 
• ave a negative 
Figure ersion of the process defined in Figure V-3 for 
DB-ID
tures, it provides a generic framework in which dynamic behavior of a system can 
be modeled. In order to do that, we need to change our focal point to behavioral aspects 
of a system, rather than the architectural components. We envision that a dynamic 
adaptation and evolution process in our problem domain should address the following: 
• Monitoring. Depending on the environment, the system should be able 
update the granularity and the hierarchy of data collection and observation 
components. 
Response. As
desirable to be able to update the defense strategy. This kind of update 
may be related to either low-level (e.g., deception tactics, atomic response 
actions) or global (e.g., dynamic policy update) decisions. 
System state. Protecting a system against attacks can h
impact on the system performance and resource usage. Therefore, 
observing and fine-tuning the system state, if necessary, against these 
fluctuations is important. 
V-4 shows the modified v
RA. Adaptation management describes the runtime decision-making process, 
while evolution management focuses on the mechanisms employed to change the runtime 
configuration of the system. DB-IDRA represents a dynamic behavior; that is, it must 
update its behavior at runtime according to the current system state. To do so, it must 
collect data, analyze the data, and deploy necessary responses based on analysis results. 
The process characterizing the behavior model must, at a minimum, manage those three 
basic functionalities comprising adaptation management, and maintain consistency and 
integrity of the system via evolution management 
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 Figure V-4 Process diagram 
3. Adaptation Management 
Adaptation management describes the process from data collection to change 
specification deployment. The adaptation process defines the activities from when an 
observation is reported, until necessary actions are deployed, as illustrated in Figure V-5. 
Observation is the initial step in adaptation management, which gathers raw data 
about individual components of the system via observers and passes those data to 
collectors. These data provide information about both intrusive processes and system 
state. Intrusion-related data are used to determine if there is an intrusive interaction with 
the system. Data about the system state indicate the necessary system properties to 
evaluate the environment regarding performance, efficiency, stability and so on. 
Observers may be expanded with the filtering functionality to decide whether to keep a 
record of an observed event or to ignore it. 
The Collection step involves gathering raw data from observers and repositories 
with the data. It is possible to place several collectors in a system, providing an 
opportunity to monitor the system from different views at each collector. Communication 
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between the observers and the collectors can be established via either sending data on a 
shared medium  (advertising), or using queries to get the data individually (soliciting) 
[35]. Collectors also store a system log containing past data about the system activity. 
This log can be used for offline analysis to evaluate how well it operates in terms of 
correctness, performance, efficiency, and so on. The number and size of buffers (required 
for this log) can be adjusted to store only the essential data for the defensive-related 
activities.  
Figure V-5 Adaptation management process 
Runtime analysis refers to the analysis of the observations passed by the 
collectors. DB-IDRA performs analysis for intrusion detection and system optimization. 
For this purpose, the analysis package employs different analyzers for each task, which 
are called intrusion and system analyzers. Based on the intrusion detection technique 
used in a system, intrusion analyzers work with a corresponding database storing the 
detection rules. This approach provides a flexible framework in which any intrusion 
detection technique (e.g., anomaly, misuse, and signature-based) can be used 
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independently from the rest of the system. On the other hand, system analyzers make 
decisions about the system state by analyzing some prespecified system variables. That 
repository contains the formal specifications for behavior patterns for intrusions and 
response actions. Observations are compared to those behavior patterns, and then 
necessary actions are produced as a result. It is also possible to delegate some of the 
primitive analysis requirements to observers, such as counting and time stamping.  
Deployment is the last step in adaptation management. The deployment module 
employ
system at runtime. There are several 
challen
in consistency and integrity of the system, evolution 
manage
s agents to carry out the specified actions. At this point, action specifications are 
distributed among agents in an organized way. Actions’ being coordinated or not has an 
impact on this distribution process. Deployment agents interact with the supervisor. Once 
the actions associated with agents are approved, agents proceed and modify the wrappers 
according to the transactions contained within the action specifications. 
4. Evolution Management 
It is not enough to decide what to change in a 
ges with respect to how those changes are integrated to the running configuration 
of the system. These challenges may be related to safety, reliability, consistency, integrity 
and correctness. There are two possible scenarios that might cause an unintended 
outcome. In the first scenario, the adaptation process may decide on an ill-considered 
action. In the second scenario, the decision made by the adaptation process is added to 
the system incorrectly. For example, an intrusion detection mechanism may decide on 
blocking the http channel; however, this might ruin an ongoing deception tactic for 
interacting with an attacker. 
In order to mainta
ment defines the approach in which actions are incorporated into the system, as 
shown in Figure V-6. Actions produced by adaptation management are reflected in the 
system’s current state, while ensuring that those actions are consistent with the global 
security policy, the current defense implementation, and the system configuration. The 
results of the activities in the supervisor are fed back to the adaptation management level 
mechanisms. The evolution management introduces two types of components to 
accomplish its tasks: supervisor and wrappers. The supervisor verifies that the actions do 
not conflict with the consistency and integrity of the system. In this context, consistency 
implies that the actions should conform to the global defense policies. Furthermore, 
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integrity ensures that all the defensive actions accomplish the same goal without 
conflicting with each other. Wrappers are the kernel-based modules that can respond to 
Figure V-6 Evolution management process 
The superviso
intrusive processes. 
r contains three sub components to manage the system consistency 
and integrity from three ger analyzes the 
actions
different perspectives. The Monitoring Mana
 that change the monitoring configuration of the system. The Deception Manager 
analyzes the deceptive actions against intrusions. The System Manager analyzes the 
actions that change the system configuration for optimization purposes. These 
components depend on each other and the global state of the system. For example, as the 
intensity of attacks against a system escalates, resources used for maintaining the global 
defense strategy also increase. In that case, the system may not be able to accommodate 
more deceptive actions and may need to adjust some of the runtime variables to keep the 
system stable. The system should be able to continue servicing its legitimate users, and 
DB-IDRA should still be able to protect the system, even with degraded capabilities. Any 
action conflicting with the criteria set by the supervisor is vetoed and the necessary 
feedback is sent back to the adaptation layer. Approved actions are sent to the wrappers 
and subsequently activated. 
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Wrappers are kernel-based modules that perform the intrusion detection and 
response actions. Within the scope of the evolution layer, wrappers respond to intrusive 
process
ate the system architecture, we used the UML package construct. 
Packag  components, use cases, or 
other p
es with the actions passed by the supervisor. Alternatively, wrappers can be used 
for intrusion detection; in fact, detection and response functionalities can be combined in 
wrappers. In this regard, observers mentioned in the adaptation layer can be implemented 
as wrappers too. 
5. Architecture Package Diagram 
To illustr
es contain groups of elements or sub systems such as
ackages. Representing the architecture in a multi-layered approach provides 
several advantages. First of all, it isolates application logic into separate components that 
can be reused. Thus, it allows designers to organize their ideas about how to distribute the 
tiers on different physical computing entities. Figure V-7 shows the architecture package 
diagram for DB-IDRA. This diagram includes the logical groupings that will be 
expanded in the detailed architecture presented in the next section. 
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Figure V-7 Architecture package diagram 
DB-IDRA is sep tation, evolution, 
operati
f the adaptation and evolution layers. These two 
layers d
arated into five layers: presentation, adap
ng system, and storage. Although presentation functionality is important, we think 
it is sufficient to note that the system should provide a user interface. Our main focal 
point is the underlying architecture. 
Application logic consists o
escribe the tasks and rules that govern the entire system behavior. Following the 
previous section on behavior model, there is a continuous interaction between the 
adaptation and the evolution layers. The operating system layer consists of the kernel-
based modules to perform response actions and monitoring activities (if monitoring is 
done in the kernel space). The storage layer provides the persistent storage mechanism 
that serves both the adaptation- and evolution- layer components. 
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VI.  DETAILED ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the previous chapters, we explored the problem domain and articulated an 
initial set of requirements for the system, from which we then derived both a conceptual 
model and high-level architecture. Our design reflects a four-layered architecture: 
presentation, application-logic, operating system and storage layers. Each layer 
represents a modular entity containing sub components to perform the entity’s assigned 
tasks. The Detailed Architectural Design phase further defines these packages, their sub 
components, and the intra- and inter-package collaborations. 
B. DETAILED ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
DB-IDRA is designed in a layered approach. The adaptation and evolution layers 
(these two are sub layers of the application logic layer) constitute the underlying logic of 
the system. The operating system layer organizes the software wrappers for detection and 
response purposes. The storage layer provides the common shared database structure, 
whereas the presentation layer allows system engineers to interact with the system both at 
runtime and offline. Each layer represents a logical grouping assigned a specific set of 
tasks. For example, the monitoring package consists of observers and collectors to gather 
data about the system and perform primitive actions (e.g., simple preprocessing of the 
sensor data). The layered architecture has interfaces between the layers and their sub 
elements. The following sections describe each package in detail and how the packages 
interact with each other. 
C. PACKAGE DESCRIPTIONS 
Packages are general-purpose mechanisms for organizing elements into groups. 
Packages are purely logical unlike components. They only exist at development time, for 
the most part, to manage complexity. This section describes each package included in the 
architecture package diagram. Package descriptions address the static structure of the 





The presentation layer encompasses the user interface, which is to be used to 
monitor system behavior and modify the system configuration in order to coordinate the 
system’s behavior. The Presentation layer can be grouped into runtime and offline 
functions. In each category there are some key design considerations that are generally 
applicable to any kind of user interface. Since intrusion detection systems perform time-
critical tasks, the user interface should be capable of presenting information about the 
entire system in a bounded response time. Additionally, it should have notification 
mechanisms to let the system engineers know when prespecified conditions occur. 
Besides timeliness, information organization and level of detail must be considered in the 
presentation layer design too. 
Figure VI-1 Monitoring Package 
2. Monitoring 
The Monitoring package is composed of observers and collectors. Observers are 
the lowest level entities interacting with the system components, and sense system-level 
events. Collectors aggregate and perform postprocessing on sensor data. Observers and 
collectors can be organized in a hierarchical monitoring structure. Each collector also 
checks that the observers are operating normally. If a collector detects a malfunction in 




Figure VI-1 illustrates an example of how monitoring components can be 
organized. The observers collect data about different aspects of the system activities. 
System activities are composed of events (E1, E2…En). In the diagram, E1 can be events 
related to all or a specific set of http requests and replies. The observers (O1, O2…Ok) can 
either collect all data on system events or selectively collect data by using prespecified 
rules as a guide. As independent entities, observers can be turned off and on during 
runtime. On the other hand, collectors provide different views over the same set of 
observers. For example, C1 gathers data from both O1 and O2, where C2 and Ct collect 
data from Ok only. This kind of an organization provides for flexible monitoring 
capabilities. For example, different groupings of collectors (like C1 and C2) can focus on 
different aspects of the system (e.g., events related to http, ftp, and DNS). Additionally, 
collectors can share the same observers (e.g., C2 and Ct) but concentrate on different 
properties (e.g., attributes) of the events being passed by those observers. 
Figure VI-2 Observation categories 
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The monitoring package passes the observations to the analysis package. First, 
observers gather the data and filter it if necessary, and then collectors group and pass 
those data to the analysis package.  
Observations are the basic system events, and they are grouped into two main 
categories, as shown in Figure VI-2. The first category includes the events generated by 
the processes running in the system. This category consists of legitimate and intrusive 
events. The second category includes the events generated by the system components to 
indicate a specific situation. Events generated by the system components include 
component failures, system variables, or processing failures. 
3. Analysis 
The Analysis package provides the functionality to analyze observations from 
three different perspectives: intrusion detection, response, and system optimization. To do 
that, the analysis package employs analyzers. Currently, we envision three types of 
analyzers: intrusion detector, system optimizer, and response generator. However, new 
analyzers can be added to the package or the existing ones can be modified. The analysis 
package employs a tracking component to isolate intrusive processes from the nominal 
system mode. This isolation enables the system to apply deception to keep the intruders 
uninformed about the actual system state, while gathering information about the nature of 
these processes. Figure VI-3 shows the internal structure of the analysis package. 
The intrusion detector performs intrusion detection based on the detection 
techniques employed in the system, which could also be hybrid (e.g., anomaly and 
signature-based detection). The detector analyzes the observations according to the 
database of detection rules. The intrusion detector interacts with the tracking component 
to compare the current behavior of an intrusive process to that process’s past behavior. If 
a process is considered to be intrusive, the specifications about the intrusion are passed to 
the response generator. 
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The system optimizer obtains system state and configuration. The optimizer gets 
that kind of data via probes. Probes are specific-purpose observers to gather data about 
system variables. Data received from probes are checked against predefined limits for the 
nominal system operation. Those limits are defined by metrics, such as performance, 
stability, and efficiency. For example, the system resources are shared by the legitimate 
services and intrusion detection activities. It would not be logical to dedicate all the 
system resources to the security activities at the expense of all the other system services. 
Therefore, optimizing the resource usage is necessary for an efficient runtime 
performance of both the security and all other legitimate activities. Based on the analysis 
performed by the optimizer, specifications about system actions are passed to the 
response generator. 
Figure VI-3 Analysis package 





akes the intrusion and system spe
duces the analysis results containing the corresponding action specifications. 
Those specifications are based on the action rules stored in the database. The response
generator takes into consideration not only the response rules but also the current defen
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The tracking component isolates intrusive processes from the normal system 
context and keeps track of their behavior and the responses against them. All the 
interact
ed in two types of actions, as shown in Figure VI-4, changing 
different asp ons. 
Intrusio
. The basic criterion for this is whether the actions are 
coordin pecification defines an agent’s task. However, 
agents 
ions with the intrusive processes are managed by the tracking component and the 
data about those interactions are stored in a database. This component provides an 
interface to the other components requesting services about the current status of the 
defense implementation. 
Analysis results are defin
Figure VI-4 Categories of actions generated by the analysis package 
The analysis package passes the analysis results to the deployment package. 
ects of the system: intrusion response and system configuration acti
n responses can be either deception-based or primitive actions. System 
configuration actions either change the components’ structure or optimize system 
performance. 
4. Deployment 
When the response analyzers pass the analysis results, the distributor assigns the 
responses to deployment agents
ated. Therefore, each response s
can collaborate with each other to realize coordinated responses. Agent1 and 
Agentn, in Figure VI-5, can participate in a coordinated response as they propagate 
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through the system and carry out their mission individually. In case of coordinated 
attacks, deceptive responses are deployed separately for each process playing a part in 
that attack. However, the necessity of coordination is obvious considering the need to 
present a consistent deceptive counter measures to the attacker. In addition, agents can 
perform responses against attacks, for instance, directing an intrusive process to a fake 
Figure VI-5 Deployment agents 
5. Supervisor 
The Supervisor is the main evolution layer component containing three sub 
componen
resource. 
ts: monitor, deception, and system managers. The Supervisor is responsible for 
maintaining the consistency bet  the current defense 
implem perties of the supervisor is that it has the right to 




e the number of 
observe
ween the global security policy and
entation. One of the essential pro
e or veto any change specification passed by the adaptation layer. Modificatio
the inappropriate changes is not part of the supervisor’s responsibilities. 
Figure VI-6 shows the interdependencies between the components of th
supervisor. For example, if the intensity of the intrusions is high and the system is not
able to allocate any more resources for intrusion detection and response activities, it may
be required to rely on less computationally-intensive deceptions or reduc
rs in order to maintain acceptable level of QoS.  
51
Monitor planning determines which observation components are necessary for 
monitoring the system activities. Planning takes into account the system performance and 
the intr
 compile-time component that translates high-level 
specifications for dece nent is used in 
preprog dules. As a result of this compilation, wrappers 
are equ
erform intrusion detection, 
response tasks, or both. Observers, mentioned in the monitoring package, can actually be 
usion load on the system. The monitor planner can reconfigure the structure of the 
monitoring components dynamically. Deception manager examines the changes before 
they are applied to the current system implementation. The deception-based responses 
must conform to both the global security policy rules and the current defense 
implementation. The system manager determines how the changes will affect the system 
performance. Optimization is necessary for maintaining the legitimate service of the 
system, while protecting it from cyber attacks. Each component uses its veto option if an 
action conflicts with the criteria set by the supervisor and sends feedback to the 
adaptation layer mechanisms. 
The interpreter is a
Figure VI-6 Internal structure of the supervisor 
6. Interpreter 
ptions into low-level wrapper language. This compo
ramming the kernel-resident mo
ipped with both detection and response capabilities.  
7. Operating System 
The Operating System package includes the kernel-based intrusion detection and 
response modules (i.e., wrappers). These modules can p
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implem  are preprogrammed with detection and 
respons
ction rules, response actions, defense implementation, 
and sys
consistency and integrity between this framework and the current defense 
ight affect the course of actions against cyber opponents. 




ented as kernel modules too. Wrappers
e capabilities at compilation time. Then these capabilities are configured at 
runtime as the system context changes. The essence of the kernel-based approach is that 
complicated tasks should not be carried out in the kernel. Wrappers provide the front-end 
of the security measures against the attackers, while benefiting from the additional secure 
environment of the kernel space. 
8. Database 
All the packages and components perform their tasks based on rules, 
specifications or configurations. There are at least five groups of data shared by the 
components: policy/doctrine, dete
tem configuration.  
• The policy/doctrine database draws the framework in which the domain-
based defense strategy is defined. The supervisor maintains the 
implementation. These rules represent legal, strategic and administrative 
issues that m
such as military and nongovernmental organizations, dictate different rules 
according to their legal status, assets being protected, defense approach, 
and so on. 
The detection rules define the intrusive behavior patterns for the detection 
technique being used in the architecture. This database is used for two 
different purposes. In the first case, the wrappers are initially equipped 
according to the rules stored in this database. In the second case, the 
intrusion detector uses these rules to detect intrusions at runtime.   
• The response actions define both deceptive and primitive actions against 
attacks. This database represents a wide spectrum of actions to increase 
the efficiency of responses. The response generator selects response 
actions based on the input from the intrusion and system analyzers.  
The defense implementation database contains the data about the o
intrusion-related activities in the system such as the current intrusive 
processes, behavior history of and past responses against those processes. 
This database affects intrusion detection, response generation and 
supervisor activities. This database provides the capability to keep track of 
these isolated intrusive processes. If the policy/doctrine database 
generic model for the system, then the defense implementation is the 
realization of the model. The defense implementation database is a 
dynamic data structure, which means, it is updated as: New intrusions (or 
suspicious behaviors) are detected; processes perform new actions, 
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interactions with the processes are terminated; and processes are 
considered to be legitimate and released from the antechamber. 
UNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
re architectures are derived from functional and non-functional 




m does from how the system 
behave
onal qualities preserving distinct characteristics for the 
design,
n with other 
domain
complexity of the design by separating what the syste
s with respect to some observable attributes such as performance, reliability, and 
stability. While functional requirements can easily be observed in an architecture 
supported by an inclusive documentation, that is not the case for non-functional 
requirements. Although, the considerations regarding this group of requirements are 
specified in advance, it is important to verify that the architectural design complies with 
the non-functional requirements. 
We have introduced six levels of non-functional requirements for the architecture: 
interoperability, stability, survivability, scalability, efficiency, and performance. We 
chose to focus on the non-functi
 rather than the common ones such as reliability and maintainability. We believe 
that it is possible to realize this architecture in an implementation meeting all of these 
qualities, but this remains to be demonstrated through a detailed case study.  
Interoperability represents the need for effective communication and 
collaboration means between different administrative domains. As an administrative 
domain collects valuable information about attacks, sharing that informatio
s allows for establishing proactive protection measures. That kind of information 
can be directly inserted into the databases for the analysis mechanisms to use. For 
example, if a domain has detected a new type of attack, then it shares this information 
with other domains, thereby permitting the other domains to take precautions to detect 
and perform deceptions in response to that attack. As the number of collaborating 
domains increases, interpretation of data from multiple sources becomes more complex. 
With its current design, DB-IDRA can use the information provided by external sources. 
This information can be either inserted into the databases or fed into the runtime process 
as system events, provided that a common communication language is already developed 
among collaborating domains. 
54
Stability of the runtime architecture necessitates that the system should confront 
as many attacks as possible to keep the overall system optimized. It is also necessary to 
evaluate the stability under different levels of intensity of conflicts to make sure the 
system
m depending on the essential services 
and ass
l protection mechanisms. In case of a 
failure 
network in order to achieve redundancy. The network can have its own supervisor with 
 operates as intended. We can measure the level of stability based on the network 
load. The network load can be separated into two types of interactions: legitimate and 
intrusive processes. The system can adjust itself by maintaining a threshold ratio between 
these two groups of users at any point in time. For example, if a system allows only one 
third of the system resources to be used for intrusive processes, then the intrusion 
detection mechanism adjusts the current defense implementation based on this threshold. 
Besides network load, the complexity of ongoing deception activities can consume 
system resources if they are at a sophisticated level such as mimicking the operating 
system. Network load and deception activities are concerned with effective resource 
allocation among legitimate and intrusive processes; however, failure of the system 
components can also cause the system to transition into unstable states. The supervisor 
needs to mitigate the effects of such disturbances. 
Survivability, in its basic definition, is a system’s capability to fulfill its mission 
(as desired) in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. The survivability process 
represents different characteristics for every syste
ets contained in it [38]. Our architecture provides a deception-based intrusion 
detection and response framework. It may be possible, for instance, to use redundancy as 
a mean to increase the survivability of the system.  
Wrappers are used in the kernel space. Wrappers modified for different purposes 
including intrusion detection and response. They provide an autonomous front-end 
against attacks with the benefit of additional kerne
within one of the supervisor components, the system can still provide intrusion 
detection services. This can be accomplished with the primitive logic preprogrammed 
into the wrappers. For example, if the deception manager fails, DB-IDRA can deactivate 
deception functionality, but still provides intrusion detection without deception.  
There are several possible ways to distribute supervisor capabilities throughout a 
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full functionality as defined in earlier sections. If any of the hosts fails, then another host 
takes over the role of the failed host. Another approach is to organize supervisors in a 
hierarc
he data transferred to the 
upper layers, because hile each host 
can ma
hical manner. Figure VI-7 illustrates that kind of a scenario for a network of eight 
hosts. In that case, each host can have either a fully functional supervisor, a supervisor 
with limited functionality or no supervisor at all. This approach supports the 
implementation of inter-domain level survivability strategies. 
based system; however, there are some distinct properties that enable the architecture to 
be scaled up for use in large distributed systems. Wrappers, in the architecture, include 
self-controlling primitive logic mechanisms. This reduces t
Figure VI-7 Hierarchical supervisor organization 
DB-IDRA represents a scalable architecture. The architecture describes a host-
unnecessary data is filtered out at the kernel layer. W
nage its defense and decision making activities by itself, network-wide analysis 
and defense need to be managed by a higher-level entity. In our architecture, this can be 
done via hierarchical organization of supervisors, as described in Figure VI-7. At level 3, 
each host manages its own protection. Level 2 represents sub domains in the network; in 
that case, SS1 and SS2 are responsible from three and two hosts, respectively. These sub 
domains can be established along with physical boundaries, such as subnets, or some 
other logic that might promote the robustness of the system. The information flow from 
level 3 to level 2 includes only the essential data that contributes to a sub domain’s 
coordinated activities. Level 1 supervisor (SSS1) collects data from sub domain 
supervisors (SS1 and SS2) to make further decisions about the network. This highest-level 
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decision making unit is responsible for the entire domain, so it also communicates with 
other domains to support interoperability. 
Performance is a general constraint over all the functional and non-functional 
requirements so that necessary means must be provided to minimize the affect of the 
monitoring and decoy actions (e.g., those of delay tactics) on the availability and 
performance of computing resources requested by legitimate users of the protected 
software components. DB-IDRA observes the runtime system performance and 
dynamically adjusts system variables to keep the system within predefined limits like 























VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The scope of this thesis study was to design a generic software architecture for 
deception-based intrusion detection and response systems. We demonstrated a systematic 
process for architecting deception-based intrusion detection and response systems. We 
followed a disciplined approach starting from requirements analysis to detailed 
architectural design. UML notations provided for representing the architectural 
abstractions. 
We started by analyzing the requirements for the decoy-based system. Since the 
intelligent software decoy concept is still evolving, we spent most of our efforts to extract 
essential requirements from the theoretical and practical results presented in related 
publications. We incorporated a set of non-functional requirements into the design 
activities, which drove the design decision throughout the development process. 
Based on these essential requirements, we developed the architecture in three 
consequent phases. In the first phase (i.e., Plan and Elaborate), we explored the domain 
and produced the requirements and the use cases. The second phase (i.e., High-level 
System Definition) used the artifacts produced in the initial phase to come up with the 
high-level definition of the architecture in a form of software-related abstractions. At this 
level, the architecture is organized in a layered structure, each layer representing a logical 
grouping of functional properties allocated to architectural packages and components. 
The last phase (i.e., Detailed Architectural Design) further defined these. 
The end product of this study is the software architecture for deception-based 
intrusion detection and response systems. The resulting architecture is generic enough to 
be flexible. For example, the architecture does not specify a particular intrusion detection 
technique. It includes the constructs that are necessary to implement the intrusion 
detection mechanism regardless of the technique being used. A major contribution of the 
research is a proposed way to incorporate deception into software architecture. The 
architecture addresses production, application, and management of deception-based 
activities. However, the details about theory of deception are out of the scope of this 
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study. The architecture also serves as a guide for optimizing system performance at 
runtime to mitigate the performance overhead introduced by the defense activities. 
Lastly, the UML diagrams provide unambiguous representations of the system 
architecture. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
A logical follow-up to this study would be to complete the development process 
and implement the architecture, resulting in a prototype. As the concept evolves, the 
prototype would also be updated. The value of prototyping in software development is 
especially significant in demonstrating evolving design concepts and facilitating 
communication between business customers and technical developers. Instead of 
implementing the whole architecture, a logical subset can also be implemented such as 
response generation, system monitoring, and system optimization.    
However, formal definition and representation of the architecture presented in this 
thesis may provide additional benefits before the implementation. For formal definition 
of the architecture, architecture description languages (ADL) can be used [28] and [29]. 
ADLs are used to define and model system architecture prior to system implementation. 
Further, ADLs typically address much more than system structure. In addition to 
identifying the components and connectors of a system, ADLs typically address: (i) 
Component behavioral specification, (ii) Component protocol specification, and (iii) 
Connector specification. A detailed analysis of the existing ADLs is required to decide 
which one is appropriated to use for this purpose.  
 A central aspect of architectural design is the use of patterns and architectural 
styles. Intrusion detection systems have commonalities in their functionalities and 
architectures. For example, the architecture represented in this study can be implemented 
on top of anomaly, misuse, or signature-based intrusion detection techniques. As long as 
the interface between the detection and response mechanisms is defined formally, the 
only difference would be related to the characteristics for each kind of detection 
technique. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that an architectural style can be developed 
for the systems that have deception-based intrusion detection and response capabilities. 
An architectural style has a number of practical benefits [41].  
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 • It promotes design reuse 
• It can lead to significant code reuse 
• It is easier for others to understand a system's organization if 
conventionalized structures are used.  
• Use of standardized styles supports interoperability.  
• By constraining the design space, an architectural style often permits 
specialized, style-specific analyses. 
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